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DOES SECTION 12(2) OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 APPLY TO
SECONDARY TRADING?: BALLAY v.
LEGG MASON WOOD WALKER, INC.
INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 19331 was enacted in response to the
devastating losses sustained in the decade after World War I by
members of the investing public as a result of the dishonest prac-
tices of those engaged in the sale of securities.2 Enacted at the
height of the Great Depression, the 1933 Act sought to prevent the
recurrence of such massive frauds by placing on sellers of securities
an obligation to fully and fairly disclose all material facts pertinent
to the sale.3 Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act,4 a broad antifraud pro-
' 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(mm) (1988) [also referred to as "the Securities Act" or "the 1933
Act"].
2 See President's Message to Congress Transmitting Recommendation for Federal Su-
pervision of Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce (Mar. 29, 1933), re-
printed in 2 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAIIAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURIrIEs ACT OF
1933 AND THE SECURrrIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 15 (1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
I-ISTORY]; see also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIvE HISTORY, supra, item 18 (discussing background of President's message to Congress).
The House Report states the following.
During the post-war decade some 50 billions of new securities were floated in the
United States. Fully half or $25,000,000,000 worth of securities floated during this
period have been proved to be worthless. These cold figures spell tragedy in the
lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings ... in these worth-
less securities. The flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was
made possible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and
dealers in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that
should be basic to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise.
Id.
2 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, item 15.
4 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). Section 12(2) states, in pertinent part, that
[a]ny person who-
(2) offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means
of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasona-
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vision, provides a purchaser of securities with a private cause of
action against a seller who omits or misstates a material fact in
connection with the sale of such securities.5 Although the applica-
bility of the statute to initial distributions of securities is well es-
tablished, district courts are divided on the issue of whether sec-
tion 12(2) affords a remedy to buyers of securities in the secondary
market.7 Recently, in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,"
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to address this issueY The court in Ballay held
that section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 does not afford a
remedy to buyers of securities in the secondary market; rather, the
section protects only buyers of initial distributions against fraud
and misrepresentation. 10
In Ballay, forty-one investors brought suit against the broker-
age house of Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. ("Legg Mason") for
alleged oral misrepresentations with respect to the book value of
certain securities they had purchased." The plaintiffs asserted
ble care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id.
See id.
8 See, e.g., Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 131 F.R.D. 118, 126 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (describing appli-
cation of § 12(2) to initial distributions as "majority rule").
7 See, e.g., In re Consolidated Capital Sec. Litig., 1990 WL 82383 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
1990) (refusing to limit section 12(2) to initial offering of securities); Farley v. Baird, Patrick
& Co., 750 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Elysian Fed. Sav. Bank v. First
Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737, 751 (D.N.J. 1989) (same); Scotch v. Moseley,
Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 709 F. Supp. 95, 98 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (same); Wilko v.
Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (rejecting argument that § 12(2) liability turns on
posture of seller, i.e., whether issuer, underwriter, dealer, or trader). Contra Grinsell v. Kid-
der, Peabody, & Co., 744 F. Supp. 931, 934 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting plaintiff's argument
that § 12(2) includes oral communications in secondary market); Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
720 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 1989) (section 12(2) covers only sales in connection with initial
distribution of securities); First Union Brokerage v. Milos, 717 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (same).
8 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991).
9 See id. at 684; see also Farley, 750 F. Supp. at 1219 (acknowledging that no circuit
court has addressed this issue).
10 Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693.
11 Id. at 684. The plaintiffs purchased securities of Wickes Company, Inc. through Legg
Mason. Id. According to the testimony of one of its managers, Legg Mason is a full-service
brokerage house that subscribes to the "value philosophy" of investing. Id. at 685. Operating
under this investment philosophy, Legg Mason promotes investment in those stocks that it
views as undervalued and as possessing potential for future growth. Id. In calculating the
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causes of action under both section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12
The jury found for Legg Mason on the section 10(b) claim and for
the investors on the section 12(2) claim. 13 Legg Mason moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a
new trial, asserting that section 12(2) should not be applied to
sales in the secondary market.14 The district court denied the mo-
tion,' 5 but certified for interlocutory appeal the issue of whether
section 12(2) applies to the secondary market.'6 The Third Circuit
denied Legg Mason's petition for interlocutory appeal, 7 and judg-
ment was entered against Legg Mason.'8 On a subsequent appeal
brought by both Legg Mason and the plaintiffs,' 9 the Third Circuit
value of these stocks, numerous factors are weighed, including intangible assets such as
"goodwill." Id. An expert at trial explained that goodwill "represents the amount of money
that is paid in the purchase of another firm in excess of what the value of all the assets of
that firm are worth." Id. at 685 n.3. Plaintiffs in Ballay argued that in calculating the book
value of the stocks, the company's goodwill should not have been included because intangi-
ble assets such as goodwill cannot be readily sold in the event of liquidation, and thus
should not be included in calculating the potential "downside" risk of an investment. Id. at
685.
12 See id. at 686. Under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1988), and its implementing rule, 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991), a private cause
of action may be brought when there has been a misstatement or an omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Section 10(b) states, in pertinent
part, the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Pursuant to this broad grant of rule-making authority, the SEC promul-
gated rule 10b-5, which states, in pertinent part, the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
13 See Balay, 925 F.2d at 686.
24 Id.
15 Id. at 686-87.
16 Id. at 687.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. Legg Mason appealed the district court's conclusion that § 12(2) applies to sec-
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reversed the district court's decision and held that section 12(2)
does not afford a remedy to buyers of securities in the secondary
market.20
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Mansmann began his
analysis by examining the precise language of section 12(2).21 That
section prohibits the misstatement or omission of a material fact in
connection with the sale of a security "by means of a prospectus or
oral communication," 2 language which became crucial to the
court's analysis.2 s Employing the maxim of construction known as
noscitur a sociis,24 the court interpreted the term "oral communi-
cation" as restricted in its meaning by the neighboring, and more
specific term, "prospectus, '25 and concluded that the phrase as a
whole thus applies only to a prospectus or oral communication is-
sued in connection with an initial offering. 26 The court then ad-
dressed the "'object and structure of the [Securities] Act as a
whole'" in an attempt to justify its reliance on the maxim noscitur
a sociis2 7 To this end, the court looked to Congress' intent in en-
acting both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
ondary market trading. Id. The investors cross-appealed the district court's refusal to
charge the jury on their "agency theory of section 10(b) liability." Id.
20 Id. at 693. The court also held that the district court's refusal to give an agency
instruction "was harmless error at most" because "the agency theory could not possibly
have provided an alternative basis for liability." Id. at 695.
21 Id. at 687 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) ("starting
point in every case involving statutory construction is the statutory language")).
22 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
22 See Balay, 925 F.2d at 688.
24 See 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16 (4th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. The maxim noscitur a sociis means that the meaning of a word,
if unclear, can be determined by reference to associated words. Id.; see also Jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) ("maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by
the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is
capable of many meanings").
21 See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688. The Third Circuit described the term "prospectus" as a
"term of art which describes the transmittal of information concerning the sale of a security
in an initial distribution." Id.
28 Id. at 688-89. The Bailay court was concerned that an expansive reading of the
phrase "oral communication" would permit a secondary buyer of securities to recover under
§ 12(2) for negligent misrepresentations, while the same buyer would be barred from recov-
ery under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 689. The court feared that a
buyer unable to satisfy the rigid scienter, reliance, and causation elements of § 10(b) would
have an actionable § 12(2) claim for negligence. Id. In addition, the court noted that to
apply the term "oral communication" to secondary trading would lead to the anomalous
result of holding sellers in the aftermarket liable only for oral and not written misrepresen-
tations since, under the court's analysis, "prospectus" applies only to initial offerings. Id.
'7 Id. at 689-90 (citing Dole v. United Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929, 935 (1990)).
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Act of 1934 and concluded that the 1933 Act was "clearly" in-
tended to regulate initial offerings .2  Finally, the court analyzed
and distinguished other antifraud provisions contained in the se-
curities acts29 that had been held applicable to both initial and sec-
ondary markets and concluded that a similarly expansive reading
of section 12(2) was not required.30
It is submitted that by holding section 12(2) applicable only to
initial offerings, the Ballay court has given section 12(2) an overly
restrictive interpretation. This Comment will suggest that neither
the express language of section 12(2) nor the congressional intent
underlying both the 1933 and 1934 securities acts dictate the nar-
row interpretation adopted by the Third Circuit in Ballay. This
Comment will examine both the language and the legislative his-
tory of the 1933 Act, and will analyze the interpretive treatment
accorded other similar antifraud provisions contained in the secur-
ities acts. Finally, this Comment will suggest that the application
of section 12(2) to secondary trading, contrary to the conclusion
reached by the Third Circuit, does not provide a "windfall" to ag-
grieved purchasers.
I. EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF SECTION 12(2)
Section 12(2) prohibits the use of misleading. statements or
omissions of material fact in connection with the sale of securities
by means of a "prospectus or oral communication." 31 The Ballay
court determined that the phrase "prospectus or oral communica-
tion" is a term of art that encompasses only a prospectus or other
28 Id. at 690.
29 Id. at 691-93. Specifically, the Third Circuit examined § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988), and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1988), and the application of these sections to trading in secondary markets.
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act proscribes fraudulent conduct in the offer or sale of secur-
ities, and states, in pertinent part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made.., not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates... as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.; see also infra note 62 (discussing recent case law denying private right of action under
§ 17(a) and discussing application of this section to secondary trading).
30 Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688-89.
81 See supra note 4 (setting forth text of § 12(2)).
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related instrument issued in connection with an initial distribution
of securities.2 Several district courts and commentators analyzing
this same statutory language, however, have rejected such a narrow
reading of the phrase.$' In Elysian Federal Savings Bank v. First
Interregional Equity Corp., 4 for example, the District Court of
New Jersey held that although the term "prospectus" clearly refers
to an initial offering, the phrase "or oral communication" is ambig-
uous."' The Elysian court concluded that had Congress intended
to limit the application of section 12(2) to initial offerings, more
expressly narrow terms were available.3 6
" Baflay, 925 F.2d at 688-89. The Ballay court first found that the more general term
"oral communication" is limited by the more restrictive term "prospectus." Id. at 688. It
next found that the term "prospectus" was used by Congress as a term of art that describes
the transmittal of information in connection with the initial distribution of a security. Id.
Finally, in support of its narrow reading of the phrase "prospectus or oral communication,"
the court pointed to several other uses of the term "prospectus" in the 1933 Act, and noted
that the term had been used repeatedly by Congress in provisions concerning registration
requirements in initial distributions. Id. at 688-89 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1988) (pro-
spectus not containing required information may not be used in interstate commerce to sell
registered securities); id. § 77j (mandating information required in prospectus); id. § 77s(a)
(granting to SEC power to amend rules concerning "registration requirements and prospec-
tuses")). Notwithstanding this conclusion by the Ballay court, it is submitted that not only
does the term "prospectus" (as defined in § 2(10) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)
(1988)) encompass more than the materials distributed in connection with an initial distri-
bution, but in addition, the phrase "or oral communication" is itself broad in scope. See
infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
s- See, e.g., Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co., 750 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
("term 'prospectus' does not show that Congress meant to limit § 12(2) to initial offerings");
Elysian Fed. Sav. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737, 750 (D.N.J.
1989) ("[i]f Congress intended to so narrowly limit the application of section 12(2), more
narrow words were available to do so ... ."); see also Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning
of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L.
REV. 641, 644 n.15 (1978) ("unlike the bulk of the 1933 Act, [§ 12(2)] is in no way related to
the registration requirements"). One commentator notes,
[I]t is by no means definitive that section 12(2) applies solely to seller misconduct
in the distribution of securities ... [S]ection 12(2) proscribes material misstate-
ments or omissions "by means of a prospectus, or oral communication." Nothing
in the section specifically limits the prohibition of such "oral communications" to
those occurring only during the initial distribution.
Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68
GEo. L.J. 163, 180 (1979).
713 F. Supp. 737 (D.N.J. 1989).
Id. at 750 n.17.
' Id. at 750. The Elysian court reasoned that "[i]f ... Section 12(2) referred to a
person who 'offers a security by means of a prospectus or related oral communication,' it
would be more clear the statute was not intended to apply to after-market transactions." Id.
(emphasis added). In other words, if the phrase "or oral communication" were more closely
linked to the term "prospectus," an argument in favor of the narrow construction would be
more compelling. Id. at 750 n.17.
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In Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co., 37 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York followed the interpretation adopted
by the Elysian court, and further noted that the terms employed
by Congress in drafting section 12(2) were themselves broad in
scope. 8 The Farley court noted that the term "prospectus" as de-
fined in section 2(10) of the 1933 Act means "any prospectus, no-
tice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or
by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms
the sale of any security."" The court was unable to find any au-
thority that dictated the use of a narrower definition of "prospec-
tus" in the context of section 12(2).40 The Farley court also looked
to the broad definition of the term "offer for sale" in section 2(3)
of the 1933 Act.41 That term includes "every attempt or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security, for value. '42 Thus, the court in Farley determined
that the term was broad enough to encompass all phases of the
selling process and held that section 12(2) was not limited to initial
offerings.43
37 750 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
" Id. at 1221.
39 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1988).
40 See Farley, 750 F. Supp. at 1221. The Farley court noted that the inclusion of writ-
ings and broadcasts in the statutory definition of the term prospectus "go[es] far beyond
what is generally evoked by the [term]-the printed document sent to potential investors
pursuant to a registration statement for a batch offering of securities." Id. at 1220. Thus,
Farley concluded that "[e]ven ignoring the broad scope of the phrase, 'or oral communica-
tion,' the term 'prospectus' does not show that Congress meant to limit section 12(2) to
initial offerings." Id. at 1221.
41 See id. (citing § 2(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1988)).
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id. (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1979)). In Naftalin, the Su-
preme Court addressed the scope of § 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at
773. In determining the applicability of the section to frauds against brokers as well as in-
vestors, Naftalin held that "the fraud occurred 'in' the 'offer' and 'sale.' The statutory
terms, which Congress expressly intended to define broadly, are expansive enough to encom-
pass the entire selling process ... ." Id. (footnotes ommitted).
Convinced that the broadly defined terms comprising § 12(2) represented Congress' de-
sire that the section have a broad scope, see Farley, 750 F. Supp. 1221, the Farley court
held that "[w]here the language of the section is so consistently broad, reference to the
general focus of the 1933 Act... is unwarranted." Id.
Farley also relied on dicta set forth in Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991). In Short, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
function of several sections of the federal securities laws and found that "section 12(1) deals
with sales 'in violation of section 5'-that is, unregistered sales of securities required to be
registered. Section 12(2) addresses all other forms of materially incorrect or misleading sell-
ing literature and oral communications in the sale of a security." Id. at 1390 (emphasis
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
It is asserted that ample authority exists to support a broad
reading of section 12(2). The Third Circuit in Ballay chose instead
to rely on the maxim noscitur a sociis in determining that section
12(2) should apply only to initial offerings.44 However, it is gener-
ally understood that maxims are to be employed merely as a
"guide to legislative intent, '45 and not rigidly so as to thwart legis-
lative intent or to render general words meaningless. 46 It is submit-
ted that by employing the maxim noscitur a sociis, the Third Cir-
cuit interpreted the language of section 12(2) in a manner that did,
in fact, render the words "or oral communication" meaningless.
Legislatures are "presumed to have used no superfluous words" in
drafting their statutes. 47 It is submitted that in its unduly restric-
tive interpretation of section 12(2), the Ballay court disregarded
this elementary principle and rendered ineffective the phrase "or
oral communication. '48
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 12(2)
In determining the scope of section 12(2), the Ballay court
subscribed to the view that the Securities Act of 1933 was intended
to regulate only initial distributions, whereas the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 was intended to regulate subsequent trading.49
However, other courts and commentators addressing this issue
have concluded that the two securities acts are not as independent
in their respective scopes as the Third Circuit indicated in
added).
'" Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688.
45 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 24; see also Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 514, 519 (1923) ("[rules of statutory construction] have no place . . . except in the
domain of ambiguity").
46 See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, wherein the author warns that in some circum-
stances application of this maxim should be avoided because "it assumes the existence of
self-evident meaning in particular words," an assumption which he refers to as a "fallacy."
Id.
I 7 Tabor v. Ulloa, 323 F.2d 823, 824 (9th Cir. 1963) (citing Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99
U.S. 48, 58 (1878)).
5 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("[iut is our duty to 'give
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute") (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell,
107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).
'1 See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690-91.; Ralph v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 692 F. Supp. 1322,
1324 (S.D. Fla. 1988); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1059
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also L. Loss, FuNDA mTALs OF SECuxrrias REGULATION 87 (2d ed.
1988) ("1933 Act is concerned primarily with distributions. Post distribution trading was to
be the subject of further legislation, which turned out to be the 1934 Act.") (emphasis in
original).
1186 [Vol. 65:1179
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Ballay.50
In Elysian, for example, the District Court of New Jersey de-
termined that the 1933 Act encompassed more than mere initial
offerings of securities. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited
the comparative analysis undertaken by the Third Circuit in In re
Data Access Systems Securities Litigation51 concerning the pur-
poses of the two securities acts.5 2 In Data Access, the Third Circuit
noted that the Securities Act of 1933 was described as "an Act 'to
provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to
prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.' ,,53 The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was described as an Act "to pro-
vide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-
counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes.' 5 4 In light of
the nonexclusive language used in both securities acts, the Elysian
court thus concluded that "the Securities Act may have a broader
concern, i.e., to ensure full and fair disclosure concerning securities
sold across state lines. There is no suggestion that the concern
about full and fair disclosure is restricted to new offerings of se-
50 See, e.g., Elysian Fed. Say. Bank, 713 F. Supp at 748-49; Scotch v. Moseley, Hallgar-
ten, Estabrook & Weeden, 709 F. Supp 95, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1988) ("while it is true that the
1933 Act was primarily concerned with regulating the distribution of new securities, its
scope is not so limited"). In Elysian, the defendant asserted that § 12(2) applies only to
initial distributions. Elysian, 713 F. Supp. at 748. While the court conceded that there was
some validity to this "generic" argument, it determined that the "conceptual overlap and
interrelationship" of the two statutes was not abundantly clear. Id. Specifically, the court
noted that the 1934 Act was divided into two titles: Title I, entitled "Regulation of Securi-
ties Exchanges," and Title 11, entitled "Amendments to Securities Act of 1933." Id. Thus,
the court stated, "On this basis alone, it does not appear accurate to flatly state the Securi-
ties Act has nothing to do with issues addressed by the Exchange Act." Id.; see also Abrams,
The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: "Participation" and
the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 902 n.138 (1987) ("1933 and
1934 acts' spheres of regulation are not mutually exclusive"); Comment, Applying Section
12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act to the Aftermarket, 57 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 955, 957 (1990)
("many cases rely on a false assumption that a 'bright line' exists between the 1933 and
1934 Acts").
13 843 F.2d 1537, 1547-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
52 Elysian, 713 F. Supp. at 748-49.
11 Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1547 (citing Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat.
74, 74 (1933)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1547-48 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 290, 48 Stat. 881
(1934)) (emphasis added).
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curities .... " The legislative materials upon which the 1933 Act
was predicated similarly do not support the argument that this law
was intended to affect only initial offerings .5  Although the report
of the House of Representatives that accompanied the 1933 Act
states that "[t]he bill affects only new offerings of securities,"5 it
also states within the same section that "[t]he [Federal Trade]
Commission may apply to the courts to enjoin any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud ... whether new or already outstanding."58
In addition, the key Senate Report that accompanied enactment of
the bill did not expressly limit the bill's application to initial dis-
tributions.59 Instead, it characterized the purpose of the bill as
"protect[ing] the investing public and honest business," and de-
scribed the basic policy of the bill as that of "informing the inves-
tor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale ... and
providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation.
60
III. SECTION 10(b) AND ITS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF
SECTION 12(2) TO SECONDARY MARKETS
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, the primary antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws,61 enable a purchaser of securities to bring a private cause of
Elysian, 713 F. Supp. at 749 (emphasis added).
" See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of 1933
Act).
. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATVE HISTORY,
supra note 2.
58 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). This language contemplates the injunctive authority of
the Federal Trade Commission, which, upon enactment of the 1933 Act, was responsible for
administering and enforcing the law. See S. REP. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIvE HIsToRY, supra note 2, item 17. It is suggested, however, that
this language negates the argument that the 1933 Act was intended to regulate only initial
distributions. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979) (rejecting argument
that 1933 Act regulates exclusively new offerings and applying § 17(a) of Act to ordinary
market trading).
59 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEISLATIV His-
TORY, supra note 2, item 17.
60 Id.
11 See Abrams, supra note 50, at 905-07. A survey conducted by Abrams concerning the
legislative history of the two statutes indicates that the two bills together were intended to
serve as "the foundation of a unified regulatory program." Id. at 906, Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder have proved to be the more frequently
invoked of the two antifraud provisions. See O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L.
Rxv. 921, 923-24 (1984) (explaining how interpretive history of § 12(2) has remained rela-
tively stagnant due to "ever-burgeoning volume of litigation brought under rule 10b-5").
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action for damages resulting from fraudulent representations or
omissions in the sale of securities.6 2
Actions instituted under section 12(2) differ from those
brought under section 10(b) in several respects.6 3 First, section
10(b) requires proof of scienter. Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant made a material misstatement or omission in
an intentional or reckless manner.6 4 The scienter requirement of
62 See supra notes 4 and 12 (setting forth text of §§ 12(2) and 10(b), respectively).
Another antifraud provision contained in the 1933 Act, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1988),
had previously been construed as affording a private right of action for purchasers of securi-
ties. See, e.g., Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (private cause of
action recognized under § 17(a)); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1979) (same). The section has subsequently been interpreted so as to deny such a rem-
edy. See, e.g., Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., 751 F.2d 555, 559 n.3 (2d Cir. 1985)
(describing Kirshner holding as "open to reexamination"); The Ltd. v. McCrory Corp., 683
F. Supp. 387, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (" '[tihere is [now] ample reason to think that the
Kirshner holding is no longer valid' ") (quoting Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc., 1985 WL
1884 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1985)).
When the Supreme Court confronted the issue of the applicability of § 17(a) to second-
ary trading in United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), it held that the section "was
intended to cover any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in the
course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market trading." Id. at 778. The
court identified this aspect of § 17(a) as "a major departure" from the remainder of the 1933
Act. Id. As a result of this limiting language, the Ballay court refused to apply the Supreme
Court's expansive interpretation of § 17(a) to § 12(2). Ballay, 925 F.2d at 691; accord Mix v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Court... rejects the reasoning of
those courts that have cited Naftalin and Section 17(a) as supporting an equally expansive
interpretation of Section 12(2)"). The Ballay court's refusal was based in part upon differ-
ences in the language employed in the two sections. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 691-92.
It has been argued that the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in expanding
§ 17(a) to reach "any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities" should also be
applied to § 12(2). See, e.g., Elysian, 713 F. Supp. at 749 (citing Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778)
(emphasis added). This proposition stems from the fact that § 12(2) "comprises the other
antifraud provision of the 1933 Act." Id. (emphasis added).
63 See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text (discussing differences between actions
brought under §§ 10(b) and 12(2)).
" See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), wherein the Supreme Court
held that "a private cause of action for damages will [not] lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id.
at 193; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) ("rationale of Hochfelder ineluctably
leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5").
Hochfelder specifically left open the question of whether reckless behavior is sufficient to
establish civil liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
Since the Hochfelder decision, several lower courts have held that reckless conduct, as well
as consciously fraudulent conduct, is sufficient for the imposition of rule 10b-5 liability. See,
e.g., Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 1984) (standard of severe
recklessness dictates extreme departure from standards of ordinary care); Coleco Indus. v.
Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977) (describing above as majority view), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 830 (1978); see also 5A A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1B-5
§ 63, at 3-272 to 3-279 (rev. 2d ed. 1991) (discussing Hochfelder and development of scien-
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section 10(b) has proved to be a formidable obstacle to recovery."
Section 12(2), on the other hand, requires a showing of mere negli-
gence as a prerequisite to recovery. 6
Section 10(b) also requires a plaintiff to prove reliance on the
defendant's misstatement or omission that caused him to suffer
damage.6 7 The standard of causation is generally more relaxed
under section 12(2),6s however, and reliance is not an element for a
section 12(2) cause of action."
ter requirement).
'1 See, e.g., Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1046 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming sum-
mary judgment granted by district court on scienter issue); Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 824
(2d Cir. 1990) (dismissing complaint for insufficient allegations of scienter); Warren, 728
F.2d at 747 ("facts fall far short of establishing scienter").
"See supra note 4 (statutory language states that seller held liable when he fails to
"sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of [the] untruth or omission"). In light of the language contained
therein, a § 12(2) plaintiff need only demonstrate negligence in order to recover. See Wa-
chovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 356 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (negligent conduct of defendant suffices), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971) (plaintiffs need
not prove scienter on part of defendant). See also Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 829
n.7 (2d Cir. 1976) (innocent misrepresentations and omissions do not give rise to a cause of
action under § 12(2)). See generally 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 64, § 3.01[c], at 1-63 to 1-72
(general discussion of requirements of § 12(2) action).
67 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) ("reliance is an element of a Rule
10b-5 cause of action"); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206 ("burden is on the plaintiff to show the
violation or the fact that the statement was false or misleading, and that he relied thereon
to his damage") (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934)). while reliance
can be described as "the plaintiff's attitude towards the defendant's misleading statement or
omission," causation concerns the relationship between the defendant's act and the plain-
tiff's injury. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 64, § 64.01[a], at 3-309.
The heavy burden imposed on § 10(b) plaintiffs to establish both reliance and causation
has been lifted considerably by the Supreme Court's recognition of certain presumptions in
lieu of a requirement of direct proof. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (when investor buys or
sells at price set by market, reliance on integrity of that price presumed for purposes of rule
10b-5 action); duPont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1987) (once materiality and scienter
have been proved, there is presumption that investment decision would have been influ-
enced by knowledge of omitted facts); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
154 (1972) (when duty to disclose material information has been breached, causation ele-
ment presumed to be established); see also Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private
Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L. REV. 584, 587-89 (1975) (discussing when posi-
tive proof of reliance is not required).
" Ballay, 925 F.2d at 692.
69 See Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1359 (5th Cir. 1981). The Junker court summa-
rized the elements of a § 12(2) action as follows:
To recover under [§ 12(2)], the plaintiff must establish that the defendant, as a
seller of a security... misrepresented or failed to state material facts to the plain-
tiff in connection with the sale. In addition the plaintiff must show that he had no
knowledge of the untruth or omission. However, the plaintiff need not establish
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In Ballay, in light of the jury's determination that Legg Ma-
son was liable under section 12(2) but not under section 10(b),70
the Third Circuit expressed concern over the double standard that
might result if section 12(2) were made available as a remedy to
purchasers in the aftermarket. 71 The Ballay court sought to pre-
vent a situation whereby a purchaser, aware of his inability to
meet the stringent requirements of section 10(b), would instead
seek redress under section 12(2)."2 It is suggested, however, that
there are two countervailing considerations that prevent purchas-
ers from obtaining such an unfair advantage.
The first consideration addresses the potential class of defend-
ants susceptible to suit under each of the two sections. Section
10(b) prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."73 Courts
have broadly construed the "in connection with" language,7 4 re-
sulting in the imposition of liability on a wide range of defend-
ants. 5 Plaintiffs seeking to recover under section 12(2), on the
that the defendant acted with scienter or that he relied in any way on the de-
fendant's misrepresentations or omissions.
Id. (citing Hill York Corp., 448 F.2d at 695) (emphasis added); see also Haralson v. E.F.
Hutton Group, Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990) (reliance not required for recovery);
Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 1988) ("reasonable reliance"
not an element under § 12(2)).
70 Ballay, 925 F.2d at 686.
71 Id. at 689; see also supra note 26 (discussing Ballay court's concern over expansive
reading of phrase "oral communication" in § 12(2)).
11 Ballay, 925 F.2d at 689.
73 See supra note 12 (setting forth text of § 10(b)).
74 See, e.g., IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1980) (actual participant in
fraud no less guilty because someone else originated plan); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1968) (phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" interpreted broadly), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In addition to those per-
sons found primarily liable for a rule 10b-5 violation, derivative or secondary liability has
often been found under a number of theories. See 5A A. JAcoBs, supra note 64, § 40.01, at 2-
416 (these theories include aiding and abetting, conspiracy, controlling person liability, ben-
eficial ownership, responsibility of principal for agent's acts, "directly or indirectly" lan-
guage of rule § 20(b) of Exchange Act, and failure adequately to train or supervise employ-
ees). See generally Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act
of 1934, 69 CALm. L. REv. 80, 80-82 (1981) (discussing liability under rule 10b-5 for aiding
and abetting, conspiracy, and respondeat superior).
75 See, e.g., Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1045 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990) ("one may
be held secondarily liable [under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5] without having actually purchased
or sold a security"); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir.)
(person other than purchaser or seller of security faces liability as aider and abetter where
requisite intent is present), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988).
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other hand, may do so only against a "seller" of securities. 6 In
interpreting the scope of the term "seller" in section 12(1), the
United States Supreme Court, in Pinter v. Dahl,"7 narrowly de-
fined the term to include either the owner who passed title, or any
person who successfully solicits the purchase.75 Lower courts have
frequently applied the rationale adopted in Pinter to actions in-
volving section 12(2). 79 Consequently, it is suggested that were sec-
tion 12(2) to apply to secondary trading, the restriction to a nar-
rower range of defendants would offset any advantage gained as a
result of the lesser standard of proof under section 12(2).
The second consideration addresses the nature of the remedies
available under the two sections. Section 12(2) contemplates that
the available recovery is limited to damages that are equal to those
available in rescission. 0 Litigants seeking redress under section
10(b), on the other hand, have recovered under various theories of
76 See supra note 4 (setting forth text of § 12(2)); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d
110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979) (absence of privity between plaintiff purchaser and non-seller issuer
defendant precluded recovery); see also Note, The Forgotten Warrior: Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Battle Against Insider Trading, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 226, 229
(1990) ("scope of the phrase 'anyone who offers or sells any security,' dramatically influ-
ences the regulatory power of Section 12(2)").
7- 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
71 Id. at 643. The person soliciting the purchase must be "motivated at least in part by
a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner." Id. at 647. The
Pinter Court reasoned that if the solicitor of the purchase had such a motivation, "it is fair
to say that the buyer 'purchased' the security from him and to align him [the solicitor] with
the owner in a rescission action." Id. In interpreting § 12(1), the Pinter Court limited the
definition of "seller" to one who passed title or one who solicits the purchase on the grounds
that to expand the scope of the term would "expose securities professionals, such as ac-
countants and lawyers, whose involvement is only the performance of their professional ser-
vices, to ... strict liability for recission." Id. at 651.
7 See, e.g., Cyrak v. Lemon, 919 F.2d 320, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1990) (adopting Pinter defi-
nition of seller for § 12(2) action); Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 635 (3d
Cir. 1989) ("no reason to distinguish the scope of 'seller' for purposes of sections 12(1) and
12(2)"); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988) (section 12(2) claim should be
considered in light of Pinter); see also Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933:
The Privity Requirement in the Contemporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 TENN. L.
R.v. 235, 261 (1984) (principles of statutory construction dictate that classes of potential
defendants under both §§ 12(1) and 12(2) must be identical).
8o See supra note 4 (setting forth text of § 12(2)). Section 12(2) specifically provides for
the return of the price paid to the seller, plus interest, less any income received while the
security was held. Id. If the plaintiff no longer owns the security in question, the damages to
be recovered are to be the "substantial equivalent of rescission." Randall v. Loftsgaarden,
478 U.S. 647, 656 (1986) (quoting L. Loss, FUNDAMENrALS OF SECURrrrIs REGULATION 1020
(1st ed. 1983)); see also Kane v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 916 F.2d 643, 646 (11th Cir.
1990) (recovery for loss on sale of stock not reduced by profits made in earlier transaction).
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damages, including benefit-of-the-bargain,81  out-of-pocket loss, 82
disgorgement,83 and rescission. 4 Indeed, because recovery under
section 10(b) may "substantially outstrip" recovery under section
12(2), the former remedy has been more frequently invoked by ag-
grieved parties. 5 Thus, the application of section 12(2) to the sec-
ondary market, notwithstanding its lesser standard of proof, is un-
likely to encourage plaintiffs to forgo the section 10(b) remedy if
that is available to them. Permitting investors to invoke section
12(2) in secondary market trading will neither undermine the poli-
cies of section 10(b) nor place purchasers at an unfair advantage in
their quest to be compensated for fraud.
" See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981) (benefit-of-the-bargain
damages may be appropriate under § 10(b) when established with reasonable certainty).
Benefit-of-the-bargain is defined as "the difference between the represented value of the
security purchased or sold and the fair value of the security on the date of the trade." See
Kaufman, No Foul, No Harm: The Real Measure of Damages Under Rule 10b-5, 39 CATH.
U.L. REv. 29, 30-31 (1989).
82 See, e.g., Randall, 478 U.S. at 661-62 (describing out-of-pocket damages as tradi-
tional recovery under rule 10b-5); James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1985);
Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1013 (11th Cir. 1985); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981), af'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1980). Out-of-
pocket recovery has been described as "the difference between the fair value of all that the
[plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no
fraudulent conduct." See Kaufman, supra note 81, at 31 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).
8 See, e.g., Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155 (if it exceeds his own loss, § 10(b) plaintiff
can recover defendant's profit from fraud); see also Kaufman, supra note 81, at 31 (describ-
ing disgorgement as "return[ing] to the plaintiff the amount of the defendant's unjust
enrichment").
" See, e.g., Randall, 478 U.S. at 656 (plaintiff entitled to return of consideration paid
reduced by any profit made or income received from security).
85 Note, supra note 76, at 232. The author states, "Not only are rule 10b-5 plaintiffs
always entitled to damages rather than rescission, but they may also recover an amount in
damages that substantially exceeds their out-of-pocket loss." Id. (citing Bateman Eichler,
HI Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 318 n.33 (1985)).
Relying on Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 203 n.25 (3d Cir. 1990),
the Third Circuit in Ballay construed the measure of damages available under § 12(2) as
being greater than that which is available under § 10(b). Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693. A closer
look at Hoxworth, however, reveals that the court in that case merely recognized that "the
availability of section 12(2) as an alternative theory of recovery could, on certain facts,
substantially increase the value of plaintiffs' expected judgment." Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at
203 n.25 (emphasis added). The court in Hoxworth then set forth the factual circumstances
that would be required in order to yield what it described as a "potentially more pro-plain-
tiff" measure of damages. Id. at 203 & n.25. In discusssing whether § 12(2) does in fact
apply to the aftermarket, the court in Hoxworth stated, "[a]lithough limiting the availability
of section 12(2) to primary distributions could decrease the likely size of plaintiffs' expected
judgment, we cannot even guess whether it does." Id. at 203-04 (emphasis in original).
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CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth,s6 approved the use of policy considerations in constru-
ing terms contained in the federal securities acts.8 Designed to
combat the fraudulent practices plaguing the securities markets,88
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 should be
construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectu-
ate [their] remedial purposes."' It is submitted that by holding
section 12(2) inapplicable to secondary trading, the Ballay court
interpreted the language of the statute in a manner that under-
mines the underlying purpose of the 1933 Act as well as the stat-
ute. Further, it is urged that if and- when other circuits are con-
fronted with this issue, section 12(2) should be construed in
greater harmony with its express language and legislative history
and in furtherance of its underlying remedial purpose.
Catherine Zucal
86 471 U.S. 681, 692-93 n.6 (1984).
" Id. at 694-95 n.7 ("it is proper for a court to consider-as we do today-policy con-
siderations in construing terms in [the securities acts]"); see also Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("[i]t is therefore proper that we consider...
what may be described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of
the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative
regulations offer conclusive guidance"); Abrams, supra note 50, at 911-15 (arguing that
"Landreth footnote ... approves consideration of more than Congress' purposes for enact-
ing a securities provision or statute.... [A]Ul nine Justices expressly approved consideration
of securities policy-consideration of the result that a congress should favor, without ex-
press reference to Congress' purposes for enacting the provision or statute").
" See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
89 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
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